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Understanding the key properties of complex systems can help us clarify and deal with many new and existing global challenges, from pandemics to poverty . . . A recent study in Nature Physics found transitions to orderly states such as schooling in fish (all fish swimming in the same direction), can be caused, paradoxically, by randomness, or ‘noise’ feeding back on itself. That is, a misalignment among the fish causes further misalignment, eventually inducing a transition to schooling. Most of us wouldn’t guess that noise can produce predictable behaviour. The result invites us to consider how technology such as contact-tracing apps, although informing us locally, might negatively impact our collective movement. If each of us changes our behaviour to avoid the infected, we might generate a collective pattern we had aimed to avoid: higher levels of interaction between the infected and susceptible, or high levels of interaction among the asymptomatic.

Complex systems also suffer from a special vulnerability to events that don’t follow a normal distribution or ‘bell curve’. When events are distributed normally, most outcomes are familiar and don’t seem particularly striking. Height is a good example: it’s pretty unusual for a man to be over 7 feet tall; most adults are between 5 and 6 feet, and there is no known person over 9 feet tall. But in collective settings where contagion shapes behaviour – a run on the banks, a scramble to buy toilet paper – the probability distributions for possible events are often heavy-tailed. There is a much higher probability of extreme events, such as a stock market crash or a massive surge in infections. These events are still unlikely, but they occur more frequently and are larger than would be expected under normal distributions.

What’s more, once a rare but hugely significant ‘tail’ event takes place, this raises the probability of further tail events. We might call them second-order tail events; they include stock market gyrations after a big fall and earthquake aftershocks. The initial probability of second-order tail events is so tiny it’s almost impossible to calculate – but once a first-order tail event occurs, the rules change, and the probability of a second-order tail event increases.

The dynamics of tail events are complicated by the fact that they result from cascades of other unlikely events. When COVID-19 first struck, the stock market suffered stunning losses followed by an equally stunning recovery. Some of these dynamics are potentially attributable to former sports bettors, with no sports to bet on, entering the market as speculators rather than investors. The arrival of these new players might have increased inefficiencies and allowed savvy long-term investors to gain an edge over bettors with different goals. . . .

One reason a first-order tail event can induce further tail events is that it changes the perceived costs of our actions and changes the rules that we play by. This game-change is an example of another key complex systems concept: nonstationarity. A second, canonical example of nonstationarity is adaptation, as illustrated by the arms race involved in the coevolution of hosts and parasites [in which] each has to ‘run’ faster, just to keep up with the novel solutions the other one presents as they battle it out in evolutionary time.

Which one of the following observations would most strengthen the passage’s claim that a first-order tail event raises the probability of further tail events in complex systems?

Solution

✅ Correct Option: 2

The correct answer is option 2. The passage argues that once a rare, extreme "first-order tail event" occurs, the probability of further extreme events increases, citing stock market gyrations after a big fall and earthquake aftershocks as examples. Option 2 directly strengthens this claim by providing empirical evidence: after a major equity crash, researchers observe dense clusters of large daily moves persisting for several weeks, with extreme days occurring far more often than normal. This is precisely the pattern the passage describes — a first-order tail event (the crash) elevating the frequency of subsequent tail events (the clustered large moves) — and it does so with concrete data on assets that customarily have low volatility, ruling out the possibility that such clustering is routine.

Option 1 is wrong (out of scope). It describes river discharge data fitting a normal, thin-tailed distribution regardless of storms. This concerns a system governed by normal distributions, which is irrelevant to the passage's claim about heavy-tailed distributions and cascading tail events in complex systems.

Option 3 is wrong (reversed). It states that after large earthquakes, seismic activity returns to baseline with no aftershock sequence, suggesting event independence. This directly contradicts and weakens the passage's claim rather than strengthening it, since the passage explicitly cites earthquake aftershocks as an example of second-order tail events.

Option 4 is wrong (reversed). It describes super-spreading episodes as isolated spikes after which outbreak sizes revert to baseline with no rise in later extreme clusters. Like option 3, this portrays tail events as independent rather than cascading, which would weaken rather than strengthen the passage's argument that first-order tail events elevate the probability of further extremes.

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